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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
I 
 
The P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LLC and the class 
of similarly situated investors (collectively, the"Class") 
appeal from the order of the district court dismissing their 
claims for securities fraud pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Class's complaint was 
filed under S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5. The complaint also 
alleged that the individual defendants were liable for the 
underlying violations of S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as control 
persons under S 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 
 
We conclude that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to 
establish the elements of reliance and loss causation, and 
that the district court applied the incorrect analysis for 
determining whether the complaint alleges that the 
purported misrepresentations were made "in connection 
with" the purchase or the sale of a security. Because the 
standard that we have articulated for the "in connection 
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with" requirement is different from the one applied by the 
district court, we vacate the judgment below and remand 
the matter for further proceedings. Given that we do not 
resolve whether the dismissal was proper under S 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, we do not address the dismissal of the Class's 
claim under S 20(a). 
 
II 
 
The Class filed this action against the Cendant 
Corporation ("Cendant"),1 its former officers and directors 
Walter A. Forbes, E. Kirk Shelton, Christopher K. McLeod, 
and Cosmo Corigliano (the "individual defendants"), and its 
accountant Ernst & Young LLP ("Ernst & Young") 
(collectively, the "defendants"). The Class alleges that the 
defendants violated S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by making 
certain misrepresentations about Cendant during a tender 
offer for shares of American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. 
("ABI") common stock. The Class consists of persons who 
purchased shares of ABI common stock during the course 
of the tender offer. The class period runs from January 27, 
1998 to October 13, 1998. The complaint does not allege 
that any member of the Class purchased securities issued 
by Cendant, or that any member of the Class tendered 
shares of ABI common stock to Cendant. Instead, it alleges 
that the defendants made certain misrepresentations about 
Cendant that artificially inflated the price at which the 
Class purchased their shares of ABI common stock, and 
that the Class suffered a corresponding loss when those 
misrepresentations were disclosed to the public and the 
merger agreement was terminated. In light of the 
procedural posture of this case, we must assume the truth 
of the facts alleged in the complaint. See In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
On December 22, 1997, the American International 
Group, Inc. ("AIG") announced that it would acquire one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Cendant was formed on December 17, 1997 as the surviving entity in 
a merger between HFS Inc. and CUC International, Inc. In the interests 
of simplicity, and because the merger predates the class period, we refer 
to Cendant as including its predecessor organizations. 
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hundred percent of the outstanding shares of ABI common 
stock for $47 per share. On January 27, 1998, Cendant 
made a competing tender offer to purchase the same shares 
at a price of $58 per share, or a total price of approximately 
$2.7 billion. In conjunction with its tender offer, Cendant 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
"SEC") a Schedule 14D-1 that overstated its income during 
prior financial reporting periods. 
 
On March 3, 1998, AIG matched Cendant's bid and 
offered to pay ABI shareholders $58 for each share of 
outstanding ABI common stock. Cendant eventually raised 
its bid price to $67 per share. It then executed an 
agreement to purchase ABI for approximately $3.1 billion, 
payable in part cash and in part shares of Cendant 
common stock. Cendant filed an amendment to its 
Schedule 14D-1 on March 23, 1998 reporting the terms of 
the merger agreement. Eight days later, Cendantfiled a 
Form 10-K reporting its financial results for the 1997 fiscal 
year. 
 
After the close of trading on April 15, 1998, Cendant 
announced that it had discovered potential accounting 
irregularities, and that its Audit Committee had engaged 
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher and Arthur Andersen LLP to 
perform an independent investigation. Cendant also 
announced that it had retained Deloitte & Touche LLP to 
reaudit its financial statements, and that "[i]n accordance 
with [Statement of Accounting Standards] No. 1, the 
Company's previously issued financial statements and 
auditors' reports should not be relied upon." Nevertheless, 
the April 15, 1998 announcement reported that the 
irregularities occurred in a single business unit that 
"accounted for less than one third" of Cendant's net 
income, and it indicated that Cendant would restate its 
annual and quarterly earnings for the 1997 fiscal year by 
$0.11 to $0.13 per share. Immediately after Cendant 
disclosed the accounting irregularities, the price of ABI 
common stock dropped from $64-7/8 to $57-3/4, 
representing an eleven percent decrease from the price at 
which the shares had been trading. 
 
Following the April 15 announcement, Cendant made 
several pubic statements in which it represented that it was 
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committed to completing the merger with ABI 
notwithstanding the discovery of the accounting 
irregularities. On April 27, 1998, Walter A. Forbes, the 
chairman of the board of directors of Cendant, and Henry 
R. Silverman, the president and the chief executive officer 
of Cendant, issued a letter to Cendant shareholders, which 
was published in the financial press. That letter states: 
 
       We are outraged that the apparent misdeeds of a small 
       number of individuals within a limited part of our 
       company has adversely affected the value of your 
       investment -- and ours -- in Cendant. We are working 
       together diligently to clear this matter up as soon as 
       possible. We fully support the Audit Committee's 
       investigation and continue to believe that the strategic 
       rationale and industrial logic of the HFS/CUC merger 
       that created Cendant is as compelling as ever. 
 
       Cendant is strong, highly liquid, and extremely 
       profitable. The vast majority of Cendant's operating 
       businesses and earnings are unaffected and the 
       prospects for the Company's future growth and success 
       are excellent. 
 
       We have reaffirmed our commitment to completing all 
       pending acquisitions: American Bankers, National 
       Parking Corporation and Providian Insurance. 
 
In a press release issued on May 5, 1998, Cendant stated 
that "over eighty percent of the Company's net income for 
the first quarter of 1998 came from Cendant business units 
not impacted by the potential accounting irregularities." 
 
On July 14, 1998, Cendant revealed that the April 15, 
1998 announcement anticipating the restatement of its 
financial results for the 1997 fiscal year was inaccurate, 
and that the actual reduction in income would be twice as 
much as previously announced. Cendant further 
acknowledged that its investigation had uncovered several 
accounting irregularities that had not previously been 
disclosed, and that those accounting irregularities affected 
additional Cendant business units and other fiscal years. 
Cendant estimated that earnings would be reduced by as 
much as $0.28 per share in 1997. After the July 14, 1998 
disclosure, the price of ABI common stock dropped until 
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Cendant issued several public statements indicating that it 
intended to continue the tender offer and that it was 
"contractually committed" to completing the ABI merger. 
Thereafter, the market price of ABI common stock was 
"buoyed" by Cendant's repeated statements that it was 
committed to completing the merger. 
 
On August 13, 1998, Cendant issued a press release 
announcing that its investigation into the accounting 
irregularities was complete. The release stated that Cendant 
would restate its earnings by $0.28 per share in 1997, by 
$0.19 per share in 1996, and by $0.14 per share in 1995. 
On August 27, 1998, Cendant issued a statement that the 
board of directors had adopted the audit report. The audit 
report was publicly filed with the SEC on August 28, 1998, 
and a copy was forwarded to the United States Attorney for 
the District of New Jersey. The report includedfindings that 
"fraudulent financial reporting" and other"errors" inflated 
Cendant's pretax income by approximately $500 million 
from 1995 to 1997, and that Forbes and Shelton were 
"among those who must bear responsibility." After the audit 
report was filed with the SEC, the price of ABI common 
stock closed at $53-1/2 per share on August 28, 1998 and 
fell further to a closing price of $51-7/8 per share on 
August 31, 1998, the first day of trading following the 
disclosure. 
 
On September 29, 1998, Cendant filed an amended Form 
10-K for the 1997 fiscal year announcing that Cendant had 
actually lost $217.2 million in 1997 rather than earning 
$55.5 million, as previously reported. That announcement 
caused the price of ABI common stock to drop further to 
$43 per share by the close of trading. On October 13, 1998, 
Cendant and ABI announced that they were terminating 
the merger agreement, and that Cendant would pay ABI a 
$400 million dollar break up fee, despite the fact that it was 
not contractually bound to do so. The termination 
agreement, which was executed the same day, provided 
that the termination of the merger would not result in 
liability on the part of Cendant or ABI, or on the part of any 
of their directors, officers, employees, agents, legal and 
financial advisors, or shareholders. In response to the 
disclosure, the price of ABI common stock dropped to 
$35-1/2 per share by the end of the day. 
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On October 14, 1998, the day after Cendant and ABI 
disclosed the termination of the planned merger, the Class 
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey alleging that Cendant and the 
individual defendants violated S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by 
making fraudulent misrepresentations concerning 
Cendant's financial condition, its willingness to complete 
the tender offer, and its willingness to complete the 
proposed merger. The complaint also alleged that the 
individual defendants were liable for those violations as 
control persons under S 20(a). The Class subsequently 
amended its complaint to expand the class period and to 
name Ernst & Young as an additional defendant in its 
claims under S 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5).2 
 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Class's 
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted 
the motion and entered an order dismissing the complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6). In explaining its dismissal order, the 
district court stated that the complaint failed to establish 
that the alleged misrepresentations were made "in 
connection with" the Class's purchases of ABI common 
stock, that the Class reasonably relied on the purported 
misrepresentations, and that the Class suffered a loss as 
the proximate result of the purported misrepresentations. 
The order also dismissed the Class's S 20(a) claim against 
the individual defendants on the basis that a claim for 
control person liability cannot be maintained in the 
absence of an underlying violation of the Exchange Act. In 
light of its decision to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), the district court declined to consider 
whether the Class's complaint also failed to satisfy the 
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that the Class also alleged in its amended complaint that 
Cendant and the individual defendants violated S 14(e) of the Williams 
Act by making purported misrepresentations in connection with the 
tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e). We do not discuss that claim, 
however, because the Class has chosen to abandon it on appeal. 
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III 
 
Before we address the merits of the Class's arguments, 
we must first resolve an important question that concerns 
our jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. In reviewing this matter, it came to our attention 
that the district court did not indicate whether it intended 
to dismiss all of the Class's claims with or without 
prejudice. In fact, the order denying the Class's motion for 
leave to amend suggests that the dismissal was without 
prejudice inasmuch as it did not foreclose the Class from 
submitting a second motion for leave to amend with a 
proposed complaint attached. The order states: 
 
       Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend their 
       complaints if any or all of their claims are dismissed. 
       However, plaintiffs have not detailed the substance of 
       any amendment or presented to the Court a proposed 
       amended complaint. Although plaintiffs no longer have 
       the right to amend their complaints as a matter of 
       course after those complaints have been dismissed, the 
       Court may still permit amendment as a matter of 
       discretion. Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1276 (3d 
       Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846, 91 S. Ct. 93, 27 L. 
       Ed.2d 84 (1970). However, the Court will not consider 
       plaintiffs' requests until they submit the sought 
       amendment for the Court's review. The present 
       complaints lack legal vitality. Without scrutiny of the 
       proposed amendment, the Court cannot determine 
       whether it, the amendment, would be resuscitable or 
       futile. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend is denied. 
 
This court has held that a dismissal without prejudice is 
not a final and appealable order under S 1291, unless the 
plaintiff can no longer amend the complaint or unless the 
plaintiff declares an intention to stand on the complaint as 
dismissed. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2000); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 705 (3d 
Cir. 1996); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). The Class did not advise the 
district court that it could no longer amend its pleadings, or 
that it had elected to stand on the complaint. Instead, it 
filed a notice of appeal with this court. In its opening brief, 
the Class represented that "[t]his court has jurisdiction over 
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this appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 because the district 
court's opinion and order dismissed of all claims with 
respect to all parties without leave to replead." 
 
On March 1, 2000, this court ordered the parties to 
submit further briefing on the question whether the district 
court had entered a final, appealable order. In its 
supplemental brief, the Class indicated that it intended to 
stand on its complaint for the purposes of our review of 
whether the dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(6), but 
not for the purposes of our independent review of whether 
the complaint complied with Rule 9(b). In effect, the Class 
took the position that it could stand on its complaint to 
satisfy the final judgment rule and, at the same time, avoid 
a de novo review of whether the complaint pleads the 
element of scienter with sufficient particularity. 
 
Our own research indicates that the Class's position is 
consistent with the law of this circuit. In Shapiro v. UJB 
Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992), this court 
recognized that a plaintiff may amend a complaint to 
comply with the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) even 
after the plaintiff stands on the complaint to invoke the 
court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. In 
that case, the district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' 
claims for securities fraud under Rule 12(b)(6) and, 
alternatively, dismissed a number of the plaintiffs' claims 
for failing to plead scienter with the particularity required 
by Rule 9(b). The district court also granted the plaintiffs 
leave to file an amended complaint to cure some of the 
defects identified in its order. See id. at 277-78. Rather 
than filing an amended complaint, however, the plaintiffs 
formally announced that they would stand on their 
complaint. See id. at 278. On review, this court concluded 
that the district court incorrectly dismissed several of the 
plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See id. at 280- 
284. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs had elected to stand 
on their complaint as dismissed, this court declined to 
affirm the dismissal under Rule 9(b). See id.  at 285 & n.14. 
Instead, it remanded the matter to the district court to 
grant the plaintiffs leave to amend those claims which were 
properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 9(b) and to evaluate 
whether the remaining claims satisfied the rule's 
heightened pleading requirements. See id. 
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In this matter, the district court did not consider the 
sufficiency of the allegations under Rule 9(b)."[B]ecause we 
are hesitant to preclude the prosecution of a possibly 
meritorious claim because of defects in the pleadings," the 
Class should be "afforded an additional, albeitfinal 
opportunity, to conform the pleadings" in the event that its 
complaint fails to comply with Rule 9(b).3  In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1435 (quoting Ross v. 
A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1979)). We 
leave it to the district court, however, to determine, in the 
first instance, whether such an amendment is required. See 
Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 285 n.14. We hold, consistent with the 
law of this circuit, that we have jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of this appeal pursuant to S 1291. See Shapiro, 964 
F.2d at 278. Our review is limited to the question whether 
the dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(6). 
 
IV 
 
Our review of a district court's decision to grant a motion 
to dismiss is plenary. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 
F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997). "A motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, accepting 
all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and 
viewing them in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff, 
[the] plaintiff is not entitled to relief. The issue is not 
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the 
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." 
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1420 
(quotations and citations omitted). In this case, we may 
affirm only if it appears that the Class could prove no set 
of facts that would entitle it to relief. See Weiner, 129 F.3d 
at 315. 
 
Section 10(b) prohibits the "use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security, . . .[of] any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). Rule 10b-5, 
which was promulgated under S 10(b), makes it unlawful 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that the Class is not free to add new factual allegations to 
comply with Rule 12(b)(6). See Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 284. 
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for any person "[t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to 
make the statements made in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading. . . in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security." 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5(b). To state a valid 
claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant (1) made a misstatement or an omission of a 
material fact (2) with scienter (3) in connection with the 
purchase or the sale of a security (4) upon which the 
plaintiff reasonably relied and (5) that the plaintiff 's 
reliance was the proximate cause of his or her injury. See 
Weiner, 129 F.3d at 315; In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d at 1417. 
 
In the present case, the defendants make numerous 
arguments to support the dismissal of the Class's 
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). They contend that the 
district court correctly concluded that the alleged 
misrepresentations were not made "in connection with" the 
purchase or the sale of a security. They also suggest that 
the Class could not have reasonably relied on any of the 
alleged misrepresentations, and that the alleged 
misstatements were not the proximate cause of the Class's 
loss. We address each argument, below, under a separate 
heading. 
 
A. 
 
We must first decide whether the Class's complaint 
pleads sufficient facts to satisfy the "in connection with" 
requirement of S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The parties have 
expressed much disagreement over the standard that this 
court applies in determining whether an alleged 
misrepresentation was made "in connection with" the 
purchase or the sale of a security. The defendants, in 
varying respects, contend that the alleged 
misrepresentations must speak directly to the investment 
value of the security that is bought or sold, and that they 
must have been made with the specific purpose or objective 
of influencing an investor's decision. In contrast, the Class 
and the SEC, as amicus curiae, argue that the "in 
connection with" requirement is satisfied whenever a 
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misrepresentation is made in a manner that is reasonably 
calculated to influence the investment decisions of market 
participants. Recognizing that "the `in connection with' 
phrase is not the least difficult aspect of the 10b-5 complex 
to tie down," we take this opportunity to clarify the 
standard that governs this matter. Chemical Bank v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting 
the difficulty in establishing a test for the"in connection 
with" requirement) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 
In Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (1977), this court 
considered the question whether certain misrepresentations 
arising out of an internal contest for the control of a closely 
held corporation were made "in connection with" the 
subsequent forced redemption of the losing parties' stock. 
There, a group of minority shareholders secretly conspired 
to remove the two majority shareholders from their 
respective positions as the chairman of the board of 
directors and as the president of the corporation. See 
Ketchum, 557 F.2d at 1023-24. By misrepresenting their 
intentions concerning the election of corporate officers, the 
minority shareholders were able to persuade the majority 
shareholders to elect them to a majority of the seats on the 
board of directors. See id. After gaining control of the board 
of directors, the minority shareholders immediately voted to 
remove the two majority shareholders from their 
officerships. See id. To entrench themselves, they also 
passed resolutions terminating the majority shareholders' 
employment and authorizing the mandatory repurchase of 
the majority shareholders' stock pursuant to a stock 
retirement agreement. The majority shareholders brought 
an action pursuant to S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to enjoin 
their ouster from the corporation and to obtain damages. 
See id. at 1024. On review, this court held that the majority 
shareholders failed to establish that the complained of 
misrepresentations were made "in connection with" the 
purchase or the sale of a security. See id. at 1027-29. In 
addition to noting that the case fell within an"internal 
corporate mismanagement" exception to S 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, the court reasoned that the degree of proximity 
between the claimed fraud and the securities transaction 
was simply too attenuated for the case to fall within the 
scope of the federal securities laws. See id.  at 1028-29 
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This court again considered the contours of the"in 
connection with" requirement in Angelastro v. Prudential- 
Bache-Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985), when it 
addressed the question whether a brokerage firm could be 
held liable under S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for making 
misrepresentations concerning the terms of its margin 
accounts. In that case, a class of investors sued a national 
brokerage firm for misrepresenting both the specific interest 
rates that it would charge in connection with a margin 
purchase and the formula that it would apply in calculating 
those rates. See Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 941. The district 
court dismissed the investors' complaint on the basis that 
the alleged misrepresentations were not made "in 
connection with" the purchase or the sale of a security. See 
id. This court reversed, holding that the investors could 
pursue their claims under S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The 
court reasoned that the requisite causal connection was 
satisfied by the brokerage firm's fraudulent course of 
dealing, notwithstanding the fact that the alleged 
misrepresentations did not relate to the merits of a 
security. See id. at 944-45. In holding in favor of the class, 
the court specifically noted that "Rule 10b-5 also 
encompasses misrepresentations beyond those implicating 
the investment value of a particular security." Id. 
 
While the decisions in Ketchum and Angelastro are 
illustrative of the point that the "in connection with" 
language requires a causal connection between the claimed 
fraud and the purchase or the sale of a security, and that 
the misrepresentations need not refer to a particular 
security, they are not helpful in applying the standard to 
the facts of this case. This case does not present a claim 
based on allegations of internal corporate misconduct 
arising from a contest for the control of a closely held 
corporation. See Ketchum, 557 F.2d at 1028. Nor does it 
concern a fraudulent course of dealing by a brokerage firm. 
See Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 944. Rather, it involves the 
public dissemination of allegedly misleading information 
into an efficient securities market. In light of the law of this 
circuit that the scope of the "in connection with" 
requirement must be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
we are compelled to look elsewhere in deciding the standard 
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that governs this matter.4 See Ketchum, 557 F.2d at 1027; 
Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 942-43, 945. 
 
In resolving the issue before us, we are persuaded by 
recent decisions in the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
that have addressed the scope of the "in connection with" 
requirement when the alleged fraud involves the public 
dissemination of false and misleading information. See In re 
Ames Dep't Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 956, 965- 
66 (2d Cir. 1993) (involving the public dissemination of 
false information in publicly filed offering documents, press 
releases, and research reports); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 
102 F.3d 390, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving the public 
dissemination of false information in a publiclyfiled annual 
report). Those courts have generally adopted the standard 
articulated in Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (in banc), 
and applied an objective analysis that considers the alleged 
misrepresentation in the context in which it was made.5 
They have held that, where the fraud alleged involves the 
public dissemination of information in a medium upon 
which an investor would presumably rely, the "in 
connection with" element may be established by proof of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Despite the arguments of the defendants, we do not find the Second 
Circuit's decision in Chemical Bank instructive in the present inquiry. In 
that case, a corporation misrepresented its financial status to a 
commercial lender when it pledged the securities of a subsidiary as 
collateral for a loan. See Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 944-45. The court 
held that the misrepresentations were "merely an incident in a 
transaction not otherwise involving the purchase or sale of securities" 
and dismissed the lender's action under S 10(b). Id. at 944 n.24. As this 
court has previously pointed out, the "Second Circuit was concerned 
that every bank loan partially secured by the pledge of stock might fall 
within the scope of [S] 10(b)." Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 946. That concern 
is not present here, where the alleged fraud involves the public 
dissemination of allegedly false and misleading statements into an 
efficient securities market. 
 
5. Contrary to the suggestions of the individual defendants, this court 
has adopted the standards articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. for 
determining whether the statutory requirements ofS 10(b) and Rule 10b- 
5 are satisfied. See Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 
515-16 (3d Cir. 1971) (adopting the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. test as the 
statutory test for actions arising under S 10(b)). 
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the materiality of the misrepresentation and the means of 
its dissemination. See In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc. Stock 
Litig., 991 F.2d at 963, 965; Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. 
Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993); In 
re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 697 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). Under that standard, it is irrelevant that 
the misrepresentations were not made for the purpose or 
the object of influencing the investment decisions of market 
participants. See In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 
991 F.2d at 965 (holding that an investor's reliance need 
not be envisioned to give rise to liability underS 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5). 
 
We conclude that the materiality and public 
dissemination approach should apply in this case. The 
purpose underlying S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to ensure that 
investors obtain fair and full disclosure of material facts in 
connection with their decisions to purchase or sell 
securities. See Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 942. That purpose is 
best satisfied by a rule that recognizes the realistic causal 
effect that material misrepresentations, which raise the 
public's interest in particular securities, tend to have on the 
investment decisions of market participants who trade in 
those securities. See In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc. Stock 
Litig., 991 F.2d at 966. We therefore adopt the reasoning of 
the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit and hold that the 
Class may establish the "in connection with" element 
simply by showing that the misrepresentations in question 
were disseminated to the public in a medium upon which 
a reasonable investor would rely, and that they were 
material when disseminated. We also point out that, under 
the standard which we adopt, the Class is not required to 
establish that the defendants actually envisioned that 
members of the Class would rely upon the alleged 
misrepresentations when making their investment 
decisions. See In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 
F.2d at 965; In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig. , 871 F. Supp. 
at 697-98. Rather, it must only show that the alleged 
misrepresentations were reckless. See In re Advanta Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999) (reaffirming 
that S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cover reckless 
misrepresentations). 
 
                                18 
  
In its petition for rehearing, Ernst & Young contends that 
the alleged misrepresentations contained in thefinancial 
statements and audit reports that it prepared for Cendant 
should not be deemed to have been made "in connection 
with" the purchase of ABI common stock unless it was 
reasonably foreseeable that they would be incorporated in 
the tender offer documents. We agree. The Supreme Court 
has warned that "[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, 
accountant, or bank who employs a manipulative device or 
makes a material misstatement . . . on which a purchaser 
relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, 
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability are 
met." Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interestate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (emphasis in 
original). Because an accountant is blameless where it 
could not reasonably have foreseen that its representations 
would be used in the purchase or the sale of securities, 
however, the Class must also establish that Ernst & Young 
knew, or that it had reason to know, that Cendant would 
use its financial statements and audit reports when making 
the tender offer for shares of ABI common stock. See 
McGann, 102 F.3d at 397 (holding that the "in connection 
with" requirement was satisfied for the purposes of Rule 
12(b)(6) where the plaintiffs "squarely alleged that the 
[auditor] knew that [its client] would include its audit 
opinion in a Form 10-K"); Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat 
Marwick, 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[t]o find 
the `connection' just because the managers, unbeknownst 
to the auditors, show the financial statements to some 
potential investor would abolish the requirement that the 
defendant's acts occur in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities"). 
 
We emphasize, though, that it is no defense that the 
alleged misrepresentations were made in the context of a 
tender offer and a proposed merger, or that they did not 
specifically refer to the investment value of the security that 
was bought or sold. It is well established that information 
concerning a tender offer or a proposed merger may be 
material to persons who trade in the securities of the target 
company, despite the highly contingent nature of both 
types of transactions. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 238-39 (1988) (holding that preliminary merger 
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discussions may be material even before an agreement-in- 
principle is reached); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Materia, 
745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "even a hint 
of an upcoming tender offer may send the price of the 
target company's stock soaring"); Securities & Exch. 
Comm'n v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that undisclosed information concerning a tender offer was 
sufficiently material to give rise to liability for insider 
trading under Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3); Securities & 
Exch. Comm'n v. Mayhew, 916 F. Supp. 123, 131 (D. Conn. 
1995) (holding that undisclosed information concerning a 
pending merger was sufficiently material to give rise to 
liability for insider trading under S 10(b)). It is also settled 
that S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 encompass misrepresentations 
beyond those concerning the investment value of a 
particular security. See Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 942-44 
(holding that a brokerage firm may be liable for 
misrepresenting the terms of a margin account); cf. 
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 508 (3d Cir. 
1988) (holding that the purchaser of an option contract has 
standing to seek damages under S 10(b) for 
misrepresentations concerning the underlying securities). 
So long as the alleged misrepresentations were material, 
the "in connection with" requirement may be satisfied 
simply by showing that they were publicly disseminated in 
a medium upon which investors tend to rely, and, in the 
case of Ernst & Young, that it knew or had reason to know 
that Cendant would use its financial statements and audit 
reports when making a tender offer for shares of ABI 
common stock. 
 
We do not resolve, however, whether the "in connection 
with" requirement is satisfied in the present case. Because 
the standard that we have set forth is different from the one 
applied by the district court, and because the parties have 
not been afforded a full opportunity to brief the issues of 
materiality and public dissemination, we will remand this 
matter to allow the district court to consider, in the first 
instance, the question whether the Class's complaint pleads 
sufficient facts to satisfy the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The parties' briefs consider whether it was reasonable for the Class to 
rely on some of the defendants' statements. On remand, the parties are 
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We note, however, that the issue of materiality typically 
presents a mixed question of law and fact, and that the 
delicate assessment of inferences is generally best left to 
the trier of fact. See Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 281 n.11. The 
district court should decide the issue of materiality as a 
matter of law only if the alleged misrepresentations are so 
clearly and obviously unimportant that reasonable minds 
could not differ in their answers to the question. See 
Weiner, 129 F.3d at 317; In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 
F.2d 628, 641 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
B. 
 
We next turn to the question whether the Class's 
complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish the element of 
reliance. It is axiomatic that a private action for securities 
fraud must be dismissed when a plaintiff fails to plead that 
he or she reasonably and justifiably relied on an alleged 
misrepresentation. See Weiner, 129 F.3d at 315 (setting 
forth reliance as an element of a private right of action 
under S 10(b) and Rule 10-5); In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1417 (same). The defendants claim 
that the complaint fails to establish the element of reliance, 
because it alleges that the defendants' misrepresentations 
were made in the context of a tender offer and a proposed 
merger, that AIG made a competing tender offer to 
purchase shares of ABI common stock at $58 per share, 
and that Cendant issued a press release on April 15, 1998 
warning investors not to rely on its prior representations 
concerning its financial condition. 
 
Traditionally, purchasers and sellers of securities were 
required to establish that they were aware of, and directly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
bound by our holding with respect to those statements inasmuch as it 
addresses the issue of materiality. See In re Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 
F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying the bespeaks caution doctrine in 
the context of materiality). They are otherwise free to renew their 
motions and make any other arguments concerning the question of 
materiality as they see fit. See In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 
F.2d 1236, 1248 n.16 (3d Cir. 1989). We note that, in the context of an 
efficient market, "the concept of materiality translates into information 
that alters the price of the firm's stock." In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1425. 
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misled by, an alleged misrepresentation to state a claim for 
securities fraud under S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Peil v. 
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing 
theories of reliance). Recognizing that the requirement of 
showing direct reliance presents an unreasonable 
evidentiary burden in a securities market where face-to-face 
transactions are rare and where lawsuits are brought by 
classes of investors, however, this court has adopted a rule 
that creates a presumption of reliance in certain cases. See 
id. Under the fraud on the market theory, a plaintiff in a 
securities action is generally entitled to a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance if he or she purchased or sold 
securities in an efficient market. See In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1419 n.8 (holding that a 
purchaser of securities in an open and developed market is 
entitled to a presumption of reliance). 
 
The fraud on the market theory of reliance is, in essence, 
a theory of indirect actual reliance under which a plaintiff 
is entitled to three separate presumptions in attempting to 
establish the element of direct reliance. See Zlotnick v. Tie 
Communications, 836 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1988). Under 
the fraud on the market theory of reliance, the court 
presumes (1) that the market price of the security actually 
incorporated the alleged misrepresentations, (2) that the 
plaintiff actually relied on the market price of the security 
as an indicator of its value, and (3) that the plaintiff acted 
reasonably in relying on the market price of the security. 
See id. The fraud on the market theory of reliance, however, 
creates only a presumption, which a defendant may rebut 
by raising any defense to actual reliance. See Basic, Inc., 
485 U.S. at 248-49. This court has pointed out that 
the presumption of reliance may be rebutted by showing 
that the market did not respond to the alleged 
misrepresentations, or that the plaintiff did not actually 
rely on the market price when making his or her 
investment decision.7 See Zlotnik, 836 F.2d at 822; Peil, 806 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. To rebut the presumption of reliance, a defendant may show that the 
misrepresentations were immaterial, that the market was aware that the 
misrepresentations were false, or that the misrepresentations were 
otherwise not assimilated into the price of the security. Of course, the 
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F.2d at 1161. This court has also held that a defendant 
may defeat the presumption of reliance by showing that the 
plaintiff 's reliance on the market price was actually 
unreasonable.8 See Zlotnik , 836 F.2d at 822; Peil, 806 F.2d 
at 1161. 
 
In the present case, we are persuaded that the Class has 
sufficiently pleaded the element of reliance to withstand a 
challenge under Rule 12(b)(6) with respect to at least some 
of the alleged misrepresentations. The complaint alleges 
that ABI common stock traded in an open and developed 
market throughout the class period, that the market price 
of ABI common stock incorporated the alleged 
misrepresentations,9 and that the Class members 
purchased shares of ABI common stock in reliance on that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
defendant may also rebut the presumption by showing that the investor 
would have purchased or sold the securities at that price even with full 
knowledge of the misrepresentation, that the investor traded in the 
securities based on an actual belief that the market price was 
inaccurate, or that the investor's decision to trade was based on some 
factor other than the market price. See Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 248; 
Zlotnik, 836 F.2d at 822; Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161. 
 
8. To establish that an investor's reliance was unreasonable, a defendant 
may show that the investor knew, or had reason to know, that the 
misrepresentations were in fact false. See Zlotnik, 836 F.2d at 822; Peil, 
806 F.2d at 1161. 
 
9. The market assimilates information concerning the possibility of a 
tender offer or a merger, and the amount of consideration that will be 
received, into the price of the securities of a target corporation. See 
Frank L. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 
1164 (1981). "The value of any stock can be understood as the sum of 
two components: the price that will prevail in the market if there is no 
successful offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will be none) 
and 
the price that will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the 
likelihood that some offer will succeed)." Id . In this case, the 
defendants' 
misrepresentations were incorporated into the price of ABI common 
stock inasmuch as they spoke to the likelihood that the tender offer and 
the proposed merger would be successful, or to the extent that they 
related to the investment value of the Cendant shares that members of 
the Class were to receive in consideration for tendering their shares of 
ABI common stock. 
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price. The complaint also states that the Class was directly 
misled by the alleged misrepresentations. Those allegations, 
if true, are sufficient to establish direct reliance and to 
create a presumption of indirect actual reliance so long as 
the Class's reliance on the purported misrepresentations or 
the market price of ABI common stock was not 
unreasonable as a matter of law. 
 
We conclude that it was reasonable for the Class 
members who purchased shares prior to March 3, 1998 to 
rely on the alleged misrepresentations occurring prior to 
that date. The defendants have not provided us with a 
legitimate reason for us to conclude to the contrary. Their 
arguments concern only the reasonableness of the reliance 
of the Class members who purchased shares of ABI 
common stock after March 3, 1998. They have no bearing 
on the investment decisions of persons who purchased 
shares of ABI common stock prior to that date, because the 
reasonableness of reliance is determined at the time of the 
transaction in question. See Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 
107 (3d Cir. 1992) (requiring an investor to rely on an 
alleged misrepresentation at the time of the purchase or the 
sale of securities); Zlotnik, 836 F.2d at 823 (same); Gannon 
v. Continental Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 566, 578 (D.N.J. 1996) 
(holding that an investor cannot rely on statements that are 
made subsequent to the purchase of securities). 
 
To the extent that the defendant's arguments suggest 
that it is unreasonable as a matter of law to rely on 
information concerning a tender offer or a merger before the 
transaction is finalized, we disagree. The Supreme Court 
has cautioned that "[n]o particular event or factor short of 
closing the transaction need be either necessary or 
sufficient by itself to render merger discussions material." 
Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 239. And, other courts have 
similarly held that information concerning a tender offer 
may be material while the transaction is still in the 
planning stage. Maio, 51 F.3d at 637; Mayhew, 916 F. 
Supp. at 131. If it may be reasonable for an investor to find 
information concerning a tentative tender offer or a merger 
important when making an investment decision, we see no 
reason why the conditional nature of those transactions 
should necessarily prevent the investor from reasonably 
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relying on that information as well. See 2 Thomas Lee 
Hazen, The Law of Securities RegulationS 13.5B, at 527 (3d 
ed. 1995) (stating that "[t]he reliance requirement is a 
corollary of materiality"). 
 
We are also persuaded that the Class members who 
purchased shares of ABI common stock between March 3, 
1998 and April 15, 1998 alleged sufficient facts to satisfy 
the element of reliance. With respect to those purchasers, 
the defendants maintain that AIG's $58 tender offer 
provided an independent valuation of ABI common stock 
upon which the Class members directly or indirectly relied. 
In effect, the defendants suggest that the market did not 
incorporate the alleged misrepresentations into the price of 
ABI common stock during the competing tender offer, and 
that the Class members would have purchased shares of 
ABI common stock to tender to AIG even if they had known 
the truth about Cendant. See Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 249 
(noting that the presumption of indirect actual reliance may 
be rebutted by showing that the plaintiff would have 
completed the transaction regardless of the alleged 
misrepresentations); Zlotnik, 836 F.2d at 822 (stating that 
the presumption of indirect actual reliance may be rebutted 
by showing that the market price was not affected by the 
alleged misrepresentations). While those arguments are 
facially appealing, we do not find them persuasive given the 
procedural posture of this case. 
 
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we 
must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and 
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiffs. See Wiener, 129 F.3d at 315. In this case, the 
Class's complaint alleges that the market price of ABI 
common stock was inflated due to the alleged 
misrepresentations, and it states that the Class purchased 
"ABI shares believing they would receive $58 per share . . . 
in a combination of cash and Cendant stock." Though we 
agree with the defendants that the market price of ABI 
common stock incorporated information concerning AIG's 
$58 tender offer, we may not assume for the present 
purposes that it did not also incorporate information 
concerning a potential acquisition by Cendant, or that 
Cendant's tender offer did not have an actual effect on the 
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Class. Indeed, it is likely that the shares of ABI common 
stock traded at a relative premium during the competing 
tender offer based on the fact that two purportedly willing 
and able suitors sought to acquire the company. It is also 
possible that members of the Class would not have 
purchased shares of ABI common stock had they been 
unable to exchange them for shares of Cendant. Because 
we must assume the truth of the allegations of the 
complaint, and resolve all competing allegations and 
inferences in favor of the Class, we agree that the existence 
of a competing tender offer did not effect the Class's 
reliance on the defendants' alleged misrepresentations. See 
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1420 
(stating that a court must credit the allegations of the 
complaint and not the defendant's responses when 
resolving conflicting allegations on a motion to dismiss). We 
also note that the effect of the $58 tender offer would have 
been limited to those members of the Class who purchased 
shares from March 3, 1998, when the tender offer was 
made, and March 17, 1998, when Cendant raised its bid 
price to $67 per share. 
 
We agree that the Class has failed to demonstrate that it 
was reasonable for its members to rely on the defendants' 
prior financial statements and auditors' reports following 
the April 15, 1998 disclosure of the accounting 
irregularities. The complaint states that Cendant disclosed 
on April 15, 1998 that it had uncovered accounting 
irregularities, and that it warned investors not to rely on its 
prior financial statements and auditor's reports when 
making an investment decision.10 The complaint further 
alleges that the common stock of both Cendant and ABI 
traded in an efficient market, and that the market price of 
each stock instantly dropped after Cendant issued the 
warning.11 In light of the curative nature of the warning 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The April 15, 1998 announcement, which wasfiled as an exhibit to 
an amendment to Cendant's Schedule 14D-1, warned: 
 
       In accordance with SAS No. 1, the Company's previously issued 
       financial statements and auditors' reports should not be relied 
       upon. Revised financial statements and auditors' reports will be 
       issued upon completion of the investigations. 
 
11. The complaint states that the market price of ABI common stock 
dropped eleven percent, from $64-7/8 to $57-3/4, following the 
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statement, and given the instantaneous decline in the 
market price of both companies' common stock, we 
conclude that the announcement immediately rendered the 
prior misrepresentations concerning Cendant's financial 
condition thereafter immaterial as a matter of law. See 
Weiner, 129 F.3d at 321 (holding that a public statement 
curing the misleading effect of a prior misrepresentation 
renders the prior misrepresentation immaterial); In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1425 
(stating that an efficient market immediately incorporates 
information into the price of a security); Teamsters Local 
282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (dicta) (stating that an investor may not ask a 
court to focus on a misrepresentation and ignore 
information that has already been disseminated). Thus, 
neither the market nor the Class members could have 
reasonably relied upon Cendant's prior financial statements 
or its audit reports after April 15, 1998. Because it made 
no misrepresentations after the curative statement was 
issued, Ernst & Young may not be held liable to members 
of the Class who purchased shares of ABI common stock 
after April 15, 1998. 
 
Nevertheless, we do not accept the defendants' contention 
that the Class could not have reasonably relied on the 
alleged misrepresentations that were included  in the April 
15, 1998 announcement. The Class claims that the April 
15, 1998 announcement misrepresented Cendant's 
financial condition by stating that the company expected to 
restate its 1997 earnings by $0.11 to $0.13 per share and 
to reduce its net income prior to restructuring and unusual 
charges by approximately $100 to $115 million. The 
defendants claim that the Class was not entitled to rely on 
those statements or on any subsequent statements, 
because the announcement warned that the 
representations were subject to "known and unknown risks 
and uncertainties including, but not limited to, the outcome 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
disclosure of the accounting irregularities, and that the market price of 
Cendant common stock plummeted forty-six percent, from $35-10/16 to 
$19-1/16, following the disclosure. 
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of the Audit Committee's investigation."12 Their argument is 
based upon both the bespeaks caution doctrine, which 
renders alleged misrepresentations immaterial, and the 
common sense principle that investors do not act 
reasonably in relying on statements that are accompanied 
by meaningful cautionary language. 
 
The parties disagree as to whether the bespeaks caution 
doctrine applies to the statements made in the April 15, 
1998 announcement that predicted the amount by which 
Cendant would restate its results for the 1997 year. The 
Class and the SEC maintain that the "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine is inapplicable, because the statements related to 
present and historical facts that were capable of verification 
and, as such, not forward-looking. See Grossman v. Novell, 
Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1123 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
bespeaks caution doctrine applies only to forward-looking 
information). The defendants, in contrast, characterize the 
statements concerning the restatement as forward-looking, 
and thus subject to the bespeaks caution doctrine, because 
Cendant had not completed a reaudit when it disclosed the 
amount of the anticipated restatement. See Harris v. Ivax 
Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802-3 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
statements made on the last day of a quarter concerning 
the results for the quarter are forward-looking). 
 
We need not decide whether the alleged 
misrepresentations in the April 15, 1998 announcement 
were forward-looking statements, however, because we 
conclude that the accompanying warnings were not 
sufficiently cautionary to warn against the danger of relying 
on the specific numbers identified in the announcement. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We note that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's safeharbor 
for forward-looking statements does not apply in this case. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 78u-5(i)(A)-(B). The alleged misrepresentations were made in 
conjunction with a tender offer and were attached as exhibits to 
Cendant's Schedule 14D-1 and the amendments thereto. The safeharbor 
expressly states that it is inapplicable to statements made in connection 
with a tender offer, except "to the extent otherwise specifically provided 
by rule, regulation, or order of the [SEC]." Id. Because the SEC has yet 
to extend the safeharbor to tender offers by rule, regulation, or order, 
we 
do not discuss the defendants' contentions that their statements were 
also protected under the safeharbor. 
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In re Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 
1993), this court instructed that cautionary language must 
be "extensive yet specific" to prevent a reasonable investor 
from relying on specific projections. There, the court 
explained: 
 
       a vague or blanket (boilerplate) disclaimer which 
       merely warns the reader that the investment has risks 
       will ordinarily be inadequate to prevent misinformation. 
       To suffice, the cautionary statements must be 
       substantive and tailored to the specific future 
       projections, estimates or opinions in the prospectus 
       which the plaintiffs challenge. 
 
Id. at 371-72. In Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 
F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir. 1994), this court clarified that 
"Trump requires that the language bespeaking caution 
relate directly to that by which plaintiffs claim to have been 
misled." 
 
In the present case, the cautionary language set forth in 
the April 15, 1998 announcement generally pertains only to 
the risk that the results of operations could vary in future 
fiscal years.13 In fact, the only risk factor that is apparently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The cautionary language states, in relevant part: 
 
       Certain matters discussed in the news release are forward-looking 
       statements, as defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act 
       of 1995. Such forward-looking statements are subject to a number 
       of known and unknown risks and uncertainties including, but not 
       limited to, the outcome of the Audit Committee's investigation; 
       uncertainty as to the Company's future profitability; the Company's 
       ability to develop and implement operational andfinancial systems 
to 
       manage rapidly growing operations; competition in the Company's 
       existing and potential future lines of businesses ; the Company's 
       ability to integrate and operate successfully acquired businesses 
and 
       the risks associated with such businesses; the Company's growth 
       strategy and for the Company to operate within the limitations 
       imposed by financing arrangements; uncertainty as to the future 
       profitability of acquired businesses; and other factors. Other 
factors 
       and assumptions not identified above were also involved in the 
       derivation of these forward-looking statements, and the failure of 
       such other assumptions to be realized as well as other factors may 
       also cause actual results to differ materially from those 
projected. 
 
(emphasis added). 
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applicable to the restatement of Cendant's results for the 
1997 fiscal year relates to the risk that the announcement's 
calculations might differ from those made by the Audit 
Committee. We are not persuaded that such a general 
statement of risk is sufficiently substantive and tailored to 
satisfy the requirements of the bespeaks caution doctrine. 
See In re Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d at 371-72. Nor 
are we persuaded that it is adequate to give investors 
reasonable notice that the projected restatement of 
Cendant's financial statements should not be trusted so as 
to make any reliance unreasonable as a matter of law. In 
our opinion, a reasonable investor may be willing to rely on 
the announcement's specific calculations concerning the 
restatement in the absence of a more detailed explanation 
of the reasons that the calculations might be incorrect and 
of the effect of any error. The announcement's blanket 
warning--that the amount of the restatement could later 
turn out to be wrong--was simply not sufficient to caution 
reasonable investors against relying on the defendants' 
representations. See Kline, 24 F.3d at 489-90 (holding that 
cautionary statements in an opinion letter were not 
sufficiently cautionary to preclude reliance where they 
suggested nothing more than the possibility that the 
speaker "might have gotten the law wrong or incorrectly 
assessed the risk that the IRS would deny deductions"); 
see, e.g., Harris, 182 F.3d at 810, 813-14 (setting forth 
meaningful and specific cautionary language as an 
appendix to the opinion). Because we conclude that the 
alleged misrepresentations concerning the restatement of 
Cendant's 1997 financial information did not include 
sufficient cautionary language, we agree that the Class 
could reasonably rely on the anticipated restatement in the 
April 15, 1998 announcement. For the same reason, we 
conclude that the Class members were not necessarily 
prevented from reasonably relying on the defendants' 
subsequent statements concerning Cendant's intent to 
merge with ABI. 
 
The Class was not entitled, however, to rely indefinitely 
upon the April 15, 1998 misrepresentations. Cendant 
announced on July 14, 1998 that it had revised the 
restatement of its 1997 income, and it disseminated the 
formal results of the Audit Committee's investigation one 
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month later. We think that it is possible that either, if not 
both, of those announcements might have cured the effect 
of the alleged misrepresentations in the April 15, 1998 
announcement and rendered the disclosure thereafter 
unreliable. However, in light of our decision to remand this 
case, and given that the parties have not discussed the 
issue, we leave it for the district court to decide in the first 
instance the point at which the particular 
misrepresentations could no longer be trusted. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, we must decide whether the Class's complaint 
adequately pleads the element of loss causation. The 
defendants contend that the complaint failed to allege 
sufficient facts to support an inference that the alleged 
misrepresentations were the proximate cause of the Class's 
loss. They maintain that the complaint shows that several 
intervening events, and not the alleged misrepresentations, 
led first to the artificial inflation and then to the decline in 
the market price of ABI common stock. In particular, they 
assert that the price of ABI common stock was inflated by 
AIG's $58 tender offer and by the approval of the merger 
agreement by the board of directors of ABI. They also 
suggest that the Class's loss was actually caused by the 
mutual termination of the merger agreement by the board 
of directors of both ABI and Cendant. We disagree. 
 
In Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 
1991), this court held that a plaintiff may establish the 
element of loss causation simply by showing that he or she 
purchased a security at a market price that was artificially 
inflated due to a fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. In that 
case, the defendants issued a press release stating that 
they were considering acquiring the outstanding shares of 
another company at the prevailing market price. See id. at 
623. The press release also warned that the defendants had 
"not yet determined to proceed with such transaction," and 
it cautioned that there could "be no assurance that [the 
defendants] will ultimately decide to make such an offer or 
that the [board of directors of the target corporation] would 
recommend such an offer to the stockholders." Id. Some of 
the plaintiffs purchased shares of the target company's 
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stock at price below the tender offer price expecting that 
the stock would be acquired at the tender offer price in the 
near future. See id. at 624. The defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), because 
the complaint lacked an assertion that "the plaintiffs 
experienced an economic loss as a proximate result of the 
alleged Rule 10b-5 violation." Id. The district court granted 
the motion to dismiss, and this court reversed. This court 
held that "the fair inference of the complaint, if one 
assumes--as we must--the truth of its allegations, is that 
the market price paid by the plaintiffs exceeded the value of 
the stock at the time of purchase based on the facts." Id. It 
reasoned that the dismissal was improper, because the 
complaint suggested that the price paid exceeded the value 
that the market would have established for the target 
company's shares had the truth been known. See id. The 
court expressed no opinion concerning the proper method 
for measuring the plaintiffs' injury. See id.  at 624 n.2. 
 
This court reached a similar conclusion in Hayes v. 
Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 107 (3d Cir. 1992). There, an investor 
filed a class action lawsuit against the directors and officers 
of a savings and loan association pursuant to S 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 claiming that the class members were injured 
when they purchased the association's stock at an inflated 
price. See id. at 105. At the urging of the directors, the 
officers, and the Resolution Trust Company, the district 
court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. See 
id. at 105. This court reversed the dismissal and remanded 
the matter for further proceedings. It concluded that the 
class had established the element of reliance, and it 
expressly found "no merit" in the Resolution Trust 
Company's contention that the complaint failed to allege 
the element of loss causation. See id. at 107 & n.2. In 
holding that the complaint stated a claim underS 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the court explained: 
 
       Plaintiff alleges that defendants knowingly or recklessly 
       made material misrepresentations which inflated the 
       market price for Bell stock, and that he relied on the 
       market price as reflecting Bell's true value. As a result, 
       plaintiff claims to have suffered injury as a stock 
       purchaser. 
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Id. at 107. 
 
We interpret Scattergood and Hayes as holding that, 
where the claimed loss involves the purchase of a security 
at a price that is inflated due to an alleged 
misrepresentation, there is a sufficient causal nexus 
between the loss and the alleged misrepresentation to 
satisfy the loss causation requirement. Cf. Sowell v. Butcher 
& Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that the difference between the purchase price and the 
"true value" of the security at the time of the purchase is 
the "proper measure of damages to reflect the loss 
proximately caused by the defendants' deceit") (quoting 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacClean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th 
Cir. 1981) modified on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)). 
We note, however, that those decisions assume that the 
artificial inflation was actually "lost" due to the alleged 
fraud. Where the value of the security does not actually 
decline as a result of an alleged misrepresentation, it 
cannot be said that there is in fact an economic loss 
attributable to that misrepresentation. In the absence of a 
correction in the market price, the cost of the alleged 
misrepresentation is still incorporated into the value of the 
security and may be recovered at any time simply by 
reselling the security at the inflated price. See Green v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 
1976) (Sneed, J., concurring) (stating that an investor's 
proximate losses are limited to those amounts that are 
attributable to the unrecovered inflation in the purchase 
price). Because a plaintiff in an action under S 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 must prove that he or she suffered an actual 
economic loss, we are persuaded that an investor must also 
establish that the alleged misrepresentations proximately 
caused the decline in the security's value to satisfy the 
element of loss causation. 
 
We find the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Robbins v. 
Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 
1997), instructive of this point. In that case, a group of 
investors filed a class action lawsuit against Kroger 
Properties, Inc. ("KPI"), its officers, and its independent 
accountant pursuant to S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the 
price of KPI stock dropped following a dividend cut. See id. 
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at 1445. Only the suit against the independent accountant 
proceeded to trial. See id. At trial, the investors presented 
evidence that the independent accounting firm made 
fraudulent statements which inflated the price at which 
they purchased KPI stock. See id. at 1445-46. It was also 
shown, however, that the dividend cut and the drop in the 
price of KPI stock occurred more than one year before the 
fraud was uncovered, and that the board of directors cut 
the dividend for reasons unrelated to the alleged fraud. See 
id. at 1445, 1448. The independent accountant moved for 
judgment as a matter of law, contending that the investors 
had failed to prove the essential element of loss causation. 
See id. at 1446. The district court denied the accountant's 
motion, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed. See id. at 1446, 
1449. The Eleventh Circuit held that the investors had 
failed to satisfy the loss causation requirement, because 
they did not present evidence that the artificial inflation 
was removed from the market price of KPI stock, thereby 
causing a loss. See id. at 1446. In entering judgment in 
favor of the accountant, the court noted that the 
misrepresentations were not discovered until more than one 
year after the drop in the stock price, and that the investors 
had not presented any evidence that the cut in dividends, 
which led to the drop in price, was related to the alleged 
misrepresentations. See id. at 1446-47. 
 
Turning to the complaint at issue in this case, we are 
persuaded that the Class has alleged sufficient facts to 
show that the alleged misrepresentations proximately 
caused the claimed loss. The Class contends that it 
purchased shares of ABI common stock at a price that was 
inflated due to the alleged misrepresentations, and that it 
suffered a loss when the truth was made known and the 
price of ABI common stock returned to its true value. The 
complaint states, in relevant part: 
 
        94. As a result of the Cendant Defendants' 
       fraudulent conduct as alleged herein, the prices at 
       which ABI securities traded were artificially inflated 
       throughout the Class Period. When plaintiff and the 
       other members of the Class purchased their ABI 
       securities, the true value of such securities was 
       substantially lower than the prices paid by plaintiff and 
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       the other members of the Class. The market price of 
       ABI common stock declined sharply from its March 23, 
       1998, $64-7/16 per share closing price, to its 
       September 29, 1998, $43 per share closing price. By 
       October 13, 1998, ABI's closing price dropped to 
       $35-1/2. In ignorance of the materially false and 
       misleading nature of the statements and documents 
       complained of herein, as well as of the adverse, 
       undisclosed information known to defendants, plaintiff 
       and the other members of the Class relied, to their 
       detriment on such statements and documents, and/or 
       on the integrity of the market, in purchasing their ABI 
       common stock at artificially inflated prices during the 
       Class Period. Had plaintiff and the other members of 
       the Class known the truth, they would not have taken 
       such action. 
 
        95. At all relevant times, the misrepresentations 
       and omissions particularized in this Amended 
       Complaint directly or proximately caused, or were a 
       substantial contributing cause of, the damages 
       sustained by plaintiff and the other members of the 
       Class. The misstatements and omissions complained of 
       herein had the effect of creating in the market an 
       unrealistically positive assessment of Cendant, as well 
       as of its financial condition, causing ABI's common 
       stock to be overvalued and artificially inflated at all 
       relevant times. Defendants' false portrayal, during the 
       Class Period, of the Company's operations and 
       prospects, as well as of Cendant's financial condition, 
       resulted in purchases of ABI securities by plaintiff and 
       by the other members of the Class at artificially 
       inflated prices measured by the difference between the 
       market prices and the actual value of such securities 
       at the time of purchase, thus causing the damages 
       complained of herein. 
 
       * * * 
 
        97. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' 
       aforesaid wrongful conduct during the Class Period, 
       plaintiff and other members of the Class have suffered 
       substantial damages in connection with their 
       purchases of ABI common stock. 
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The complaint further indicates that the price of ABI 
common stock was "buoyed" by the defendants alleged 
misrepresentations, and that it dropped in response to 
disclosure of the alleged misrepresentations and the 
termination of the merger agreement. Assuming the truth of 
those allegations, and taking all reasonable inferences in 
the light most favorable to the Class, we agree that the 
Class is entitled to offer evidence to support its claim. 
 
Notwithstanding the allegations of the complaint, 
however, the defendants maintain that the price of ABI 
common stock was inflated, not by the alleged 
misrepresentations, but rather by AIG's $58 tender offer 
and by the approval of the merger agreement by the board 
of directors of ABI. We do not agree. The Class period 
covers persons who purchased shares of ABI common stock 
prior to both events. For those purchasers, neither the 
competing tender offer nor the board approval of the merger 
agreement could have provided an independent valuation 
that would have inflated the price of ABI common stock. 
 
Nor can we say, for the Class members who purchased 
shares of ABI common stock after that time, that the 
announcement of AIG's $58 bid and the approval of the 
merger agreement were sufficient to destroy the causal 
connection between the alleged misrepresentations and the 
artificial inflation in the price of ABI common stock. It is 
well established that not every intervening event is 
sufficient to break the chain of causation. See Rankow v. 
First Chicago Corp., 870 F.2d 356, 367 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that to allow any intervening change in market 
conditions not directly caused by the defendant to break 
the chain of causation and exempt the defendant from 
liability would eviscerate Rule 10b-5); W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts S 44 (5th ed. 1984) 
(explaining that proximate causation is not destroyed by 
every intervening event). So long as the alleged 
misrepresentations were a substantial cause of the inflation 
in the price of a security and in its subsequent decline in 
value, other contributing forces will not bar recovery. See 
Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1447 n.5. While we are mindful that 
the defendants may disprove that the Class suffered a loss 
as a result of the alleged misrepresentations by showing 
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that the misrepresentations were not a substantial factor in 
setting the price of ABI common stock during the Class 
period, we disagree that the defendants may do so at this 
stage of the proceedings. See In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1420 (setting forth the standard for 
reviewing a motion to dismiss). It is possible that one 
portion of the inflation was attributable to both the 
competing tender offer and the board approval of the 
merger agreement, and that the remaining portion of the 
inflation was attributable to the alleged misrepresentations. 
It is equally reasonable to infer that the alleged 
misrepresentations played a substantial role in the decision 
of the board of directors of ABI to approve the merger 
agreement, especially considering the fact that ABI 
shareholders were to receive Cendant common stock in 
exchange for their shares of ABI common stock. 
 
We also disagree with the defendants' contention that the 
mutual termination of the merger agreement was an 
intervening event that caused the Class's loss. The 
complaint alleges that the market price of the common 
stock of both ABI and Cendant declined in response to the 
alleged fraud. From that allegation, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the disclosure of the falsity of the alleged 
misrepresentations played a substantial factor in the 
termination of the merger agreement. Indeed, it is possible 
that the board of directors of ABI no longer found it 
beneficial for its shareholders to exchange shares of ABI 
common stock for shares of Cendant common stock 
following the discovery of Cendant's true financial 
condition. In light of the sharp decline in the price of 
Cendant common stock, it is also reasonable to infer that 
the board of directors of Cendant sought to cancel the 
merger to avoid diluting the shares of its existing 
shareholders. We therefore agree with the contentions of 
the Class and conclude that the complaint alleges sufficient 
facts to establish the element of loss causation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we conclude that the complaint alleges sufficient 
facts to establish the elements of reliance and loss 
causation. We do not resolve, however, whether the 
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complaint also satisfies the "in connection with" 
requirement; nor do we consider whether the complaint 
complies with the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 
9(b). Rather, we vacate the judgment of the district court 
and remand this matter so that the district court may 
determine, in the first instance, whether the alleged 
misrepresentations were material and publicly disseminated 
in a reliable medium and, in the case of Ernst & Young, 
whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Cendant would 
use its financial statements and audit reports in its tender 
offer for shares of ABI common stock.14  We also instruct the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We find no merit in the defendants' claim that the dismissal should 
be affirmed on the alternative ground that the complaint fails to allege 
that the defendants shared a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust 
and confidence" with the Class members. The complaint does not allege 
that the defendants failed to disclose material facts. See, e.g., Dirks v. 
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 6611983) (considering whether 
a tippee was under a duty to disclose inside information or to abstain 
from trading); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) 
(considering whether a financial printer was under a duty to disclose 
information to shareholders of a corporation for whom he did not work 
or to abstain from trading in the corporation's securities); Gordon v. 
Diagnostek, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (considering 
whether an acquiring corporation was under a duty to disclose certain 
financial information to the shareholders of a target corporation); Lerner 
v. FNB Rochester Corp., 841 F. Supp. 97, 99, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(considering whether a potential acquirer was under a duty to disclose 
material information to the shareholders of a target corporation); 
Gershon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 128, 129-31 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (considering whether a corporation was under a duty to disclose 
to the shareholders of another corporation that it intended to terminate 
a contract for the sale of goods); Lindlom v. Mobile Telecomm. 
Technologies Corp., 985 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D.D.C. 1997) (considering 
whether a subsidiary whose securities were not traded owed a duty to 
disclose certain information to the shareholders of the parent 
corporation). Rather, it alleges that the defendants made affirmative 
misrepresentations. Though defendants who are neither fiduciaries nor 
insiders generally are not under a duty to disclose material information, 
they subject themselves to liability under S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when 
they make affirmative misrepresentations. See Deutschman v. Beneficial 
Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that nothing in the law 
of this circuit "can be construed to require afiduciary relationship 
between a section 10(b) defendant and the victim of that defendant's 
affirmative misrepresentation"). 
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district court to consider whether the complaint 
nevertheless should be dismissed for a failure to plead 
scienter with particularity. Because we do not resolve 
whether the dismissal was proper under S 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, we do not address the merits of the dismissal of the 
Class's claim under S 20(a). 
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